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LEGITIMACY CONCERNS OF THE 
PROPOSED MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT 
COURT: IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE? 
JOSÉ MANUEL ALVAREZ ZÁRATE* 
Abstract: Growing concerns in Europe about international investment regimes 
and investor-state dispute settlement systems pushed the European Union into 
pursuing the creation of an investment court system and a multilateral invest-
ment court. The European Union started this reform through the Comprehensive 
Economic Trade Agreement, the Vietnam-EU Free Trade Agreement, and by di-
rect persuasion of other countries to start negotiations at the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law. Visible reasons for the change include 
concerns over the perception of a lack of transparency, coherence, and arbitra-
tors’ partiality, all of which diminish the legitimacy of the multilateral invest-
ment court. Other reasons might be laid on the budgetary risks of more than 213 
claims against EU countries. To address these legitimacy concerns, the EU 
wants to replace traditional party-appointed arbitrators with a two-tiered in-
vestment tribunal system comprised by a roster of members selected by the state 
parties on the treaty. This Essay argues that the creation of the multilateral in-
vestment court needs to follow democratic principles in order to be legitimate. 
History has shown us that the EU has abused its power in the past when imple-
menting resolution systems. Foregoing negotiation, comment by member na-
tions, and implementing a tribunal at its own behest has shown this. The EU 
multilateral investment court proposal has legitimacy deficiencies because the 
EU has relied on its power to impose its views so far, i.e. its proposal was not 
previously negotiated multilaterally amongst other member nations. It is thus 
possible that the appointment of the future judges to this court will likely be 
subject to the political constraints and veto that the International Court of Justice 
or World Trade Organization appointments suffer today. This could leave small 
economies at a disadvantage because they might be subject to permanent, politi-
cally biased judges. A superior solution would be to adopt better arbitrator dis-
qualification rules, clear interpretation directives to avoid law creation, and 
stricter arbitrator qualifications. 
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2766 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2765 
INTRODUCTION 
Private investment is indispensable to the world’s economic develop-
ment and prosperity, and thus, it must come with means to be protected. 
When protecting threatened economic freedom and investments, democratic 
values must be preserved and pursued. Moreover, international economic in-
stitutions need to be legitimate. Thus, a question that the world faces within 
the discussion of a reform of the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) 
system is how to achieve a democratic and legitimate ISDS framework. In 
theory, such a system would preserve equal sovereign space between all 
participant states, as well as safeguard each state’s right to regulate in the 
public interest and to protect investors. The path to achieving this ideal sys-
tem, however, would likely be contentious, even in the face of growing crit-
icism about unequal treatment among member states, anti-democratic is-
sues, and legitimacy problems. 
Legitimacy concerns regarding the ISDS system, such as lack of co-
herence, predictability, and biased arbitrators, have been at the center of 
debates since cases were recorded under the Argentinian crisis in the early 
2000s.1 These concerns, however, were historically regarded as a problem 
from the global south,2 and thus little attention was given to those countries 
who were criticizing ISDS,3 or to Third World Approaches to International 
Law scholars.4 These legitimacy concerns finally received the attention of 
the European Union (EU), and became a global problem when private com-
panies began to file claims in EU’s own backyard. From 1999 until May 18, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Lluís Paradell-Trius, The Legitimacy of Investment Treaties: Between Exit, Voice, and 
James Crawford’s Quest for a More Democratic International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY, STATE-
HOOD, AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES CRAWFORD 90, 90 (Christine 
Chinkin & Freya Baetens eds., 2015) (describing the Argentinian Attorney General’s complaints 
in 2003 surrounding investor claims); Horacio D. Rosatti, Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversión, 
El Arbitraje Internacional Obligatorio y el Sistema Constitucional Argentino, at 1 (2003), https://
www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/arbitrationlaw12arbitration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J63R-YD9J]. 
 2 See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legit-
imacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473 (2009) (describing the legiti-
macy crisis); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatiz-
ing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 
(2005) (outlining the “looming legitimacy crisis”). 
 3 In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez assumed his presidential seat in 1999. Venezuela: Introduction, 
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.
html [https://perma.cc/27LR-6NHB]. In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner assumed his seat in 2003. Argen-
tina: Introduction, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ar.html [https://perma.cc/4G5T-E9LS]. In Bolivia, Evo Morales assumed his seat in 
2006. Bolivia: Introduction, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html [https://perma.cc/D576-63NZ]. 
 4 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3–8 (3d ed. 2010). 
2018] Legitimacy and the Multilateral Investment Court 2767 
2018, 213 claims were brought against EU states, amassing billions of dol-
lars.5 These concerns festered when ISDS negotiations were launched be-
tween the EU, the United States of America,6 and Canada,7 and when the 
Australian Government decided to no longer include the ISDS in future in-
ternational investment agreements (“IIAs”).8 
In 2014, during ongoing trade and investment negotiations between the 
EU and the United States, the European Commission (EC) launched a pub-
lic consultation on international investment and the ISDS.9 The results of 
the consultation and parliamentary debates, which considered criticisms 
from academia, human rights, consumer associations, and environmental 
organizations, gave the EU the tools to say that ISDS transformation was 
needed.10 The system was perceived as illegitimate,11 partial, and opaque.12 
In fact, the EU concluded that the ISDS could not reliably be neutral and 
consistent.13 Most of the blame for the ISDS’s problems was put on the 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See generally Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/ISDS [https://perma.cc/Q7ZY-5DZ9] (identifying international investor-state arbi-
trations). 
 6 In June, 2013 the governments of the EU member states gave the European Commission 
guidelines setting out what the negotiations should include, stating that the EU should seek to 
include provisions on investment protection and ISDS. See Ivana Kottasova, America’s Free 
Trade Deal with Europe Is Dying, CNN BUS. (May 4, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/
05/04/news/economy/us-eu-trade-agreement-ttip-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3WJ-75X9]. 
Negotiations for an agreement—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—
started in July, 2013, but the process was abruptly stopped in 2017. See Federal Ministry for Econ. 
Affairs and Energy, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), BMWi, https://www.
bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/ttip.html [https://perma.cc/N2VK-TGCJ]. 
 7 Negotiations concluded in August, 2014 and the treaty was signed in October, 2016. Com-
prehensive Economic & Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6QX-CJHL]. 
 8 Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State Arbitration: On 
Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 257, 257–58 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014). 
 9 EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT ON ONLINE PUBLIC CON-
SULTATION ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
(ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TTIP), at 
2 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HTK2-Q7H8] [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON TTIP]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Brower & Schill, supra note 2, at 473 (outlining how the ISDS was seen as illegiti-
mate). Commentators question the ISDS framework and ask whether there is a “[l]egitimacy Cri-
sis” of investment law, and whether the investment protection is an obstacle to development. See 
id.  
 12 EUROPEAN COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON TTIP, supra note 9, at 14 (describing concerns 
about transparency in the public consultation). 
 13 Jean-Claude Juncker, President, European Commission, State of the Union (Sept. 13, 2017) 
[hereinafter Juncker State of the Union Address] (noting that the ISDS’s “ad hoc nature [could] 
not sufficiently guarantee impartiality and predictability”). 
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shoulders of the arbitrators themselves. To fix the problems with the ISDS, 
the EU proposed to replace the ISDS with a system that could guarantee 
transparency, consistency, predictability, and the possibility of appeal.14 Ac-
cordingly, in 2015, the EC proposed to include in future trade and investment 
negotiations an investment court system (“ICS”) such as the one negotiated 
with Canada and Vietnam.15 The ICS was announced as the blueprint for a 
proposed multilateral investment court (“MIC”).16 Under the EU’s proposal, 
ad hoc arbitrators would be replaced by permanent members of an ICS. 
The EU has also managed to include its ICS and MIC proposals in the 
agenda of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD),17 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL),18 and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Directorate-General for Trade, Inception Impact Assessment: Establishment of a Multilat-
eral Investment Court for Investment Dispute Resolution, EUROPEAN COMM’N, at 2 (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_trade_024_court_on_investment_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ECS2-G75R] [hereinafter Inception Impact Assessment] (noting that the EU 
proposed a system that provided “transparency, consistency, predictability and the possibility to 
appeal”). 
 15 According to the European Commission, CETA “is the EU’s most comprehensive FTA to 
date,” and future modernization of trade agreements with Mexico and Chile “should be compara-
ble to, and compatible with, our FTA with Canada . . . .” EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL: 
TOWARDS A MORE RESPONSIBLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 30, 33 (2015), http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV4Z-W8DN] [herein-
after EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL]. 
 16 In the EU’s view, “a bilateral appellate mechanism should be included not only in TTIP, but 
should become a standard feature in all EU trade and investment agreements with other negotiating 
partners.” EUROPEAN COMM’N, INVESTMENT IN TTIP AND BEYOND—THE PATH FOR REFORM: 
ENHANCING THE RIGHT TO REGULATE AND MOVING FROM CURRENT AD HOC ARBITRATION TO-
WARDS AN INVESTMENT COURT 11 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_
153408.PDF [https://perma.cc/L4XJ-UH63]. In the discussion paper from the expert meeting be-
tween Canada and the European Commission, however, it was stated that “it is not the intention of 
the European Commission nor of the Government of Canada to propose it as a model for the current 
discussions on the establishment of a permanent multilateral investment dispute settlement system.” 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER FOR EXPERT MEETING: ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILAT-
ERAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1 (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2017/january/tradoc_155267.12.12%20With%20date_%20Discussion%20paper_Establishment%20
of%20a%20multilateral%20investment%20Geneva.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUL6-AZ77] [hereinafter 
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR EXPERT MEETING]. 
 17 UNCTAD, Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy Tools, IIA ISSUES 
NOTE, Nov. 2017, at 4–6, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_2/IIA_Issues_
November_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8ES-G2VV]. 
 18 See U.N. General Assembly, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
Note by the Secretariat, Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142 (Sept. 
18, 2017) (describing the ISDS reform proposal); see also U.N. General Assembly, Possible Re-
form of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Submission from the European Union, 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145 (Dec. 12, 2017) (same). 
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velopment (OECD).19 In 2017, the EC decided that UNCITRAL’s forum 
was the prime forum to conduct further negotiations on the MIC.20 Shortly 
thereafter, the EU began negotiations on ISDS reform in UNCITRAL.21 
Although the imposition of a MIC has the potential to resolve some of 
the problems for certain exporting European countries and Canada, the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) blueprint does 
not. Should the CETA blueprint be the model implemented, it would not 
resolve questions concerning independence, impartiality, fragmentation, 
interpretive consistency, sovereign regulatory authority, or the risk of legis-
lating from the bench, as its undertakings do not address such issues. These 
issues have a tendency to adversely affect small and medium economies 
(“SMEs”) in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe, which despite 
being a majority of members in any international organization, neither have 
the means to influence multilateral negotiations nor appoint impartial mem-
bers of the proposed MIC. 
The political process of transformation of the ISDS employed in CETA 
has failed to show that MIC judges would be impartial, independent, and 
free of political or economic bias, or that the final treaty would not be inter-
preted adversely towards SMEs. To the contrary, knowing that a state’s past 
behavior is the best predictor of its future behavior,22 one could predict that 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See generally Freedom of Investment Roundtables: Summary of Discussions, OECD, http://
www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/oecdroundtablesonfreedomofinvestment.htm [https://
perma.cc/3H69-CC68] (collecting summary reports of OECD roundtables). For example, under 
the OECD’s meetings, Canada and the EU prepared and chaired a discussion about the MIC in 
2016. U.N. General Assembly, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement Framework, Comments from International Intergovernmental Organizations, Addendum, 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/918/Add.7. (June 12, 2017). The issues of 
an ICS and the right to regulate were addressed during Roundtables 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26, be-
tween 2014 and 2017. Id. at 6–7. 
 20 DISCUSSION PAPER FOR EXPERT MEETING, supra note 16, at 7–8; Juncker State of the 
Union Address, supra note 13. 
 21 On March 20, 2018, when the Council of the European Union declassified a document 
titled Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, the strategy was clear. U.N. Secretariat, Note from the General Secretariat 
of the Council to Delegations, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 12981/17.ADD1.DCL1 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12981-2017-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/RUV8-
QUUE]. The Press Release on March 20, 2018 was clear on this point, confirming that “[o]n the 
basis of the mandate provided by the Council, the Commission will start negotiations with its trading 
and investment partners in the framework of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL).” Press Release, Council of the European Union, Multilateral Investment Court: 
Council Gives Mandate to the Commission to Open Negotiations (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/20/multilateral-investment-court-council-
gives-mandate-to-the-commission-to-open-negotiations/pdf [https://perma.cc/28PZ-MFCD]. 
 22 See ZACHARY SHORE, A SENSE OF THE ENEMY: THE HIGH-STAKES HISTORY OF READING 
YOUR RIVAL’S MIND 149, 164 (2014) (describing the continuity heuristic, which describes how 
the best predictor of someone’s behavior in the future is the person’s behavior in the past). 
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future negotiations of a MIC would be tainted by illegitimate and anti-
democratic means.23  
By reviewing the Hague and Paris Conferences and looking at the 
UNCITRAL agenda, one can see that the final result of the UNCITRAL 
negotiations might not sufficiently guarantee the impartiality, independence, 
and neutrality required for a legitimate world court, and the legitimacy con-
cerns most likely will not vanish. Also, states from the global south and in-
vestors could be worse off with a MIC system because they will be deprived 
of the choice of who will decide their dispute. Moreover, there looms the 
danger that permanently appointed judges may not be as impartial as 
claimed by the EU. 
Supporting commentary from the EU for changing the ISDS system 
includes implementing so called “modern provisions” in bilateral agree-
ments—such as CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA)—
aimed at transforming the ISDS system to act like traditional courts, and by 
establishing a MIC.24 It also notes that no agreement should limit the ability 
of the EU to take measures to achieve legitimate public policy objectives 
considered appropriate on consumer, environmental, social, and labor pro-
tection issues. The EU believes that the establishment of a multilaterally 
agreed-upon system for investment dispute resolution with a permanent 
body of judges could provide a significant degree of predictability and co-
herence. The EU criticizes the current ISDS framework for its lack of fair-
ness and preservation of the right of public authorities to regulate.25 This, 
together with the ISDS system’s criticized lack of neutrality and consisten-
cy, is a clear message about the lack of confidence in the arbitral college, 
and explains why the EU’s first step was to use its institutional power to 
remove the ISDS rulings from private hands to a public body. 
The discussions are relevant today because a group of 27 sovereign 
states represented by the EU, which among them account for more than 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Such means to garner the SME’s consensus would include direct or indirect political pres-
sures, veiled threats of cutting economic cooperation in other areas, limiting or avoiding the discus-
sion on SME’s interests during negotiations, or controlling the rules of the new institution, which 
puts the principle of the sovereign equality of a group of countries on others. For example, in the 
Novartis cancer drug (Glivec) case, Colombia was warned that if it moved forward with the patent 
compulsory license, it could jeopardize funds from the United States to help the peace process in 
Colombia as well as future membership in TTIP. Zoe Williams, Investigation: As Colombia Pushes 
for Cancer Drug Price-Cut and Considers Compulsory Licensing, Novartis Responds with Quiet 
Filing of an Investment Treaty Notice, IA REP. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/
investigation-as-colombia-pushes-for-cancer-drug-price-cut-and-considers-compulsory-licensing-
novartis-responds-with-quiet-filing-of-an-investment-treaty-notice/ [https://perma.cc/KF2V-XVPS]. 
 24 EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 15, at 21. 
 25 Id. The EU also cites as problematic the “risk of the abuse of provisions common to many 
of those agreements, as well as lack of transparency and independence of the arbitrators.” Id. 
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1,400 IIAs, have officially accepted the criticisms from some scholars and 
countries that the ISDS framework has deficiencies in its legitimacy, neu-
trality, transparency, consistency, and costs, and that a policy will need to be 
undertaken in the near future to try to solve these deficiencies.26 
Three questions arise from the call to reform: (i) could the EU’s sole 
criteria suffice to address all the concerns about ISDS, or is there a need to 
put in place other interests before establishing a MIC; (ii) what previous 
experiences has the world had with European proposals of world courts; 
(iii) were the previous outcomes fair, or did they only allow western econ-
omies to control the judges?  
This Essay addresses three issues that are central to the legitimacy of a 
world court. First, this Essay addresses the importance of a real global con-
sensus. This Essay aims to show how the EU’s proposal to establish a per-
manent MIC does not have sufficient global legitimacy because its agenda, 
objectives, and proposed rules were not agreed upon globally through for-
mal international means. If the final aim is to create a multilateral institution 
that will wield global public authority that claims to be globally legitimate, 
it will need to be devoid of political pressures and follow basic democratic 
principles throughout its creation.27 This entails holding formal, transparent, 
and comprehensive multilateral discussions to establish an agenda, then 
follow previously designed procedures that guarantee that export and im-
port capital countries will have equal sovereign rights during the negotia-
tions. Undue pressures that favor large, exporting countries’ interests to lim-
it their duty to protect investments on their home soil should also be avoid-
ed. The means used by the EU to set the world agenda in the past have 
leaned toward the use of power to obtain a questionable global consensus, 
and it is not clear if this trend will cease during the UNCITRAL negotiation. 
Second, this Essay aims to show that the current process for implement-
ing a MIC echoes prior European behavior during the Hague and Paris Con-
ventions. This Essay compares political and theoretical discussions that took 
place during the Hague’s Second Conference of 1907,28 when the Permanent 
Court of Arbitral Justice (PCAJ) was established, and in the Paris Conference 
of 1919 when the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Inception Impact Assessment, supra note 14. 
 27 See generally ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC 
LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Thomas Dunlap trans., 2014) (discussing the 
public authority of courts). The approach of the proposed MIC is functional, and thus a prospec-
tive MIC will tend to unify criteria and universalize concepts under a fragmented notion. 
 28 One of the aims of the conference was to create a binding international court for compulso-
ry arbitration to settle international disputes, which was not accepted. Instead, a voluntary arbitra-
tion was approved. 
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(PCIJ) was discussed.29 These two projects sought to solve Europe’s persis-
tent war problems. In both instances, European powers used their influence to 
multilateralize their own interests when sketching the proposals to establish a 
world court, without considering the interests of SMEs, which were not in-
cluded in the text of the Conventions. The current MIC negotiations could 
repeat the same history, evidenced by the EU’s behavior in other treaties and 
organizations, such as UNCITRAL, EU-Vietnam FTA, and the CETA blue-
print. In other words, the EU’s proposal would not change the treaties’ asym-
metric conditions, such as the provisions that allow developed countries to 
have control over the members of the court through their appointment and 
veto, which will endanger their independence and impartiality.30 
Third, this Essay tries to address concerns about the potential lack of 
independence and impartiality of the future MIC judges in light of the cur-
rently proposed appointment process. The EU has suggested following the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body or the International 
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) opaque and politicized appointment procedures that 
will likely give rise to biased, politically-pocketed judges. Accordingly, if 
the purpose for creating a MIC is to ameliorate issues relating to the lack of 
independence, impartiality, transparency, and neutrality of arbitrators, the 
lack of transparency as seen in CETA’s blueprint will breed a lack of legiti-
macy if employed in a MIC’s creation, as appointments are at risk of being 
influenced by the States that have the power to veto and impose the judges 
that follow their interests. 
In sum, there is no need to completely discard the current ISDS system 
because the main concerns about the ISDS include fixable issues, like arbi-
trator independence, impartiality, and consistency. Before dismantling an 
institution that existed before Hugo Grotius,31 the EU should consider a few 
alternative solutions. First, unifying the language of substantive obligations 
in IIAs through a multilateral treaty to ensure consistency. Second, making 
changes regarding controlling arbitrators’ powers and duties, such as clarify-
ing that the creation of obligations are within states’ power, and that arbitra-
tors that are chosen for the appellate proceedings do not hear cases in the 
first-tier proceedings. Third, providing a clearer set of rules that guarantee the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators, and adopt better rules for arbitra-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Article 14 of the League of Nations gave the Council of the League the task for formulating 
plans for the establishment of a PCIJ. History, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/
en/history [https://perma.cc/RCM7-5RBJ]. 
 30 Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollak, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics 
of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 398 (2014). 
 31 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1123 (Richard Tuck & Jean 
Barbeyrac eds., Liberty Fund 2005) (noting that one way to prevent war is arbitration). 
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tor disqualification. Fourth, implementing clear interpretative directives to 
avoid legislation from the bench and stricter arbitrator’s qualifications. 
I. A DEMOCRATIC MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT 
The EU has limited the discussion of ISDS reform to implementing a 
judicial system that balances investors’ rights while safeguarding the state’s 
right to regulate.32 At the same time, the EU has expressed concerns about 
arbitrators’ decisions and their independence and impartiality.33 To ensure 
that the process of creating such a judicial system is fair and free from polit-
ical pressure, the process must be based on democratic principles, or at the 
very least, providing all participating states an equal sovereign voice. Un-
fortunately, this did not occur: the EU did not include a discussion on how 
an ISDS system should be democratically constructed, nor did it follow 
democratic principles during discussions for the creation of the proposed 
MIC. 
It is important that international institutions be democratically con-
structed because institutional legitimacy is a byproduct of the usage of 
democratic procedures throughout their creation. An international institu-
tion created through formal consensus might be legal and binding, but 
might have legitimacy deficits if certain affected states are not allowed to 
voice their interests, causing those interests to be neither discussed nor con-
sidered. In the absence of a democratic process, certain states (particularly 
smaller states without much bargaining power) may be subjugated and tak-
en advantage of to obtain their consensus. Legitimacy would entail that an 
international court be built through democratic procedures and rules, open 
to the deliberation of all affected subjects, with the discussion of the initial 
agenda to the final approval of it devoid of political pressures to obtain the 
consensus. I do not claim here that there is a problem with the efficacy, or 
the fairness, of judicial decisions.34 Collaborative, deliberative policy and 
global communicative procedures are necessary, however, to create a sys-
tem imbued with fidelity.35  
                                                                                                                           
 32 Freedom of Investment Roundtables: Summary of Discussions, supra note 19, at 6–7. 
 33 See Inception Impact Assessment, supra note 14 (describing identified problems in the 
ISDS system). 
 34 See Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Democracy; Justice, and Legitimacy of International Courts, in 
LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 338, 338–40 (N. Grossman et al. eds., 2018) (discuss-
ing the difference between a court being effective at advancing justice and a court being legiti-
mate). 
 35 JOSÉ M. ALVAREZ, EL INTERÉS NACIONAL EN COLOMBIA 200–01 (Universidad Externado 
de Colombia ed. 2003). See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CON-
TRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287–328 (William Rehg trans., 
1996) (discussing the procedural deliberative process). 
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To proceed with a change to the ISDS system, the democratically ob-
tained consent of all parties is needed. In an effort to sway votes in its favor, 
and conscious of the power that can be displayed over less-developed econ-
omies to change the ISDS framework, the EU has behaved questionably 
when it informed Asian, African, and Latin American countries of its plan 
for reform, noting that it intended to cause a “transformation” of the ISDS 
system and taking for granted that everyone will comply with its proposal.36  
Despite the prima facie consensus obtained by the EU to start discus-
sions about the establishment of a permanent MIC, legitimacy deficiencies 
still exist. The EU did not use a multilateral process of formal, transparent, 
and comprehensive discussions with other states to set up the agenda where 
the ISDS system and the IIAs regime could be transformed. Considering that 
there are more than 3,300 IIAs signed by approximately 180 countries, formal 
discussions could occur before launching negotiations in UNCITRAL with a 
pre-established agenda. Moreover, the basic democratic principle of equal 
sovereign participation was not followed. The few EU internal consultations, 
UNCITRAL and OECD discussions, and informal consultations with some 
countries do not provide the necessary legitimacy to say that the agenda had a 
global consensus.37  
This process is wrought with the same political deficiencies that have 
led to the creation of the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). As in the ICSID, the informal opinions of some develop-
ing countries are heard, but are not truly taken into account. The means 
used by the EU to propose a MIC has shown an inclination towards the use 
of power to obtain a questionable global consensus even from the beginning 
of its proposal.38 It is not clear that this trend would be stopped during the 
UNCITRAL negotiation. 
On the future of the MIC, should an investment court, with the support 
of the United States, succeed in future trade and investment agreement, the 
global agenda for ISDS would be settled along with the whole content of 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 15 (proposing a “transformation” of 
the ISDS framework). The EU announced that Mexico and Chile’s agreements will be changed ac-
cording to its blueprint. EUROPEAN COMM’N, INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ESTABLISHMENT OF 
A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_trade_024_court_on_investment_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9LW-KEP6]. 
 37 See generally Freedom of Investment Roundtables: Summary of Discussions, supra note 19 
(summarizing OECD discussions); Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Delega-
tions, supra note 21 (identifying the directives prioritized by the EU). 
 38 See VON BOGDANDY & VENZKE, supra note 27, at 156 (discussing the importance of ob-
taining meaningful consensus when seeking to build legitimate international courts). 
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the changes, leaving no space for the rest of the world to influence the 
agenda or its contents. 
II. LEARNING FROM HISTORY 
The EU initiative for the establishment of a MIC is not the first attempt 
to create an international court for the protection of foreign property and 
business. In the Hague’s First and Second Conferences of 189939 and 
1907,40 the inviolability of private property at sea in time of war was dis-
cussed, and it was decided that arbitration was the proper mechanism to 
resolve disputes between states regarding these issues.41 In 1907, the crea-
tion of PCAJ was discussed.42 In 1919, the creation of another court was 
discussed in the Paris Peace Conference, where the Covenant of the League 
of Nations was presented by western powers. During this twenty-year peri-
od, these three international conferences shared four common features: (i) 
how, and by whom, would disputes be resolved between countries; (ii) the 
incapacity of non-western states to influence in the outcome of the confer-
ences; (iii) the discussions between western states—some Europeans and 
the United States—with peripheral ones on the principle of equal sovereign-
ty of States, which transcended to the court composition; and (iv) the dis-
turbing questions of racial equality and the standard of civilization. Now, in a 
similar substratum as one hundred years ago, the interests of SMEs interests 
do not have equal voice and participation in the creation of the proposed 
MIC, nor do they have equal international sovereignty rights in practice. 
                                                                                                                           
 39 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: THE HAGUE, 
MAY 18–JULY, 29, 1899, at 46, 114, 411, translated in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES (1920) [hereinafter 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE]. 
 40 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: 
THE HAGUE, JUNE 15–OCTOBER 18, 1907, at 350, translated in 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (1920) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE 
VOL. I]. Article 1 of the “Project for the Establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice” stated:  
With a view to promoting the cause of arbitration, the contracting Powers agree to 
constitute, without altering the status of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Court 
of Arbitral Justice, of free and easy access, composed of judges representing the var-
ious juridical systems of the world, and capable of ensuring continuity in arbitral ju-
risprudence.  
Id. See generally Arnulf Becker Lorca, Sovereignty Beyond the West: The End of Classical Inter-
national Law, 13 J. HIST. INT’L L. 7 (2011) (discussing the proceedings at the Hague conferences); 
Liliana Obregón, The Third World Judges: Neutrality, Bias, or Activism at the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and International Court of Justice? in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTER-
NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 181, 182–84 (William A. Schabas & Shannonbrooke Mur-
phy eds., 2017) (same). 
 41 PROCEEDINGS OF 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 350. 
 42 Id.  
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At the dawn of the twentieth century, European powers and the United 
States used their power to control discussions in the Hague and Paris Con-
ferences. They wanted to secure the outcome of the rules, to get the consent 
of the invited countries, to have the text of the agreements signed, and to 
secure a favorable interpretation of the agreed texts by securing the ap-
pointment of the judges.43 Also, during the conferences, non-western states’ 
proposals, which looked for the recognition of equal sovereignty among 
states and sought equal right to appoint non-western judges, were systemat-
ically rejected.44 
In the first peace conference of 1899 at the Hague, only a few coun-
tries had the chance to participate. The invitation of the Queen of the Neth-
erlands was limited to the European powers, the United States, China, Mex-
ico, Persia, and Turkey, to discuss the proposal of the Russian Emperor.45 
Thus, as recognized at the beginning of the meeting, discussions were held 
with the aim of solving the persistent European war problem within this 
region for more than twenty-four centuries.46 Despite this aim, however, 
there was not much discussion on how to prevent future wars. On the con-
trary, the invited participants instead devoted time to discuss how they 
should act during their wars.47 
The 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes was open to the participation of other states, but those new adherents 
would not have the same rights as the attendees to the conference, and 
would be subject to conditions to become members.48 The agenda and 
committees were managed by Russia, France, England, Germany, and the 
United States, and the voices of Mexico, Siam, and China were only heard 
at the time of voting or adhering to propositions. 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See generally 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE, supra note 39; PROCEEDINGS OF 1907 HAGUE 
CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40; DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 
621–22 (1928) (summarizing the Hague conferences). 
 44 See Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 45 (describing the rejection of Japan’s racial equality 
proposal); PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 330–32 
(describing calls by non-western states for equality). 
 45 See 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE, supra note 39, at 9 (noting the states present at the confer-
ence). 
 46 Id. at 14. 
 47 A number of declarations about the regulation of war were signed by the majority of partic-
ipants, including the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, 
the regulation of the laws and customs of war on land (such as the rights and duties of neutrals, the 
bombardment of undefended ports, the inviolability of private property in time of naval war, etc.), 
the prohibitions of throwing projectiles from balloons, the prohibition of asphyxiating gas, and the 
prohibition of expanding bullets, among others. See id. at 247–66 (outlining the declarations 
signed by the participants at the conference). 
 48 See id. at 215–18 (summarizing the meeting which gave other states rights, but not to the 
degree of the Great Powers). 
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At the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes, the second such peace conference, the invitation was extended to forty-
four states, including eighteen from Latin America and three from Asia. Irre-
spective of the bigger participation of non-western states, the agenda was 
again set by large, economically influential powers, and was predominantly 
carried out to discuss the regulation of war.49 The Commission appointed at 
the Conference to discuss dispute settlement began its work by revising the 
convention of 1899. The United States presented a project for the estab-
lishment of a tribunal, open to all signatory powers, but Belgium opposed 
this because permanent adjudicators would abolish the freedoms enjoyed by 
states to choose their own arbitrators.50 England replied by stating that the 
question was not to supplant the Permanent Court, but to create a new court 
in addition where the choice would be free to the nations.51 
When voting upon the draft Convention respecting the limitation of the 
employment of force for the recovery of public contract debts, at the Hague 
Peace Conference of 1907, Argentina, followed by other Latin American 
states, had reservations about debt arising from ordinary contracts, where 
arbitration could be used in instances of denial of justice by the courts of the 
debtor country and that national debt, would not give rise to military ag-
gression or the material occupation of the soil of American nations in any 
case.52 Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador all voted for the United States’ 
proposal concerning contract debts, but under a specific reservation.53 
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, neutral states were invited, but 
again with limited capacities to intervene. England pointed this out in an 
unofficial meeting, where it advised them that Great Powers simply wanted 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Of the thirteen conventions finally agreed upon, only one was about a subject other than 
war. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 599–696 
(identifying the agreed-upon conventions). 
 50 Id. at 348. 
 51 Id. at 348–49. Arbitration would be mandatory for the recovery of contract debts to limit 
the use of force to collect them from non-western States. Id. at 616. Scholars provide a decent 
account of the discussions given to the U.S. proposal, and how James Brown Scott “juggled” in 
explaining that the court’s judgments would respect the independence and equality of states. 
Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 27–28. 
 52 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 330–31. Para-
guay, Nicaragua, and Guatemala adhered to the reservations of Argentina, but Ecuador and Uru-
guay made reservations in the First Commission. Id. at 331–32. Forty-four delegations took part in 
the voting and five abstained. Id. at 332. 
 53 See id. at 331 (agreeing with the reservation that “the principles established in this proposi-
tion cannot be applied to claims or controversies arising out of contracts made by the Government 
of a country with foreign subjects, when in these contracts it is expressly stipulated that these 
claims or controversies should be submitted to the judges of the tribunals of the country”). 
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to have them consider the project, but not to actually have any meaningful 
impact.54 
Another example of how power was used by western states is the dis-
cussion about the composition of the League of Nations Executive Council. 
The Great Powers gave themselves a permanent seat each as well as the pow-
er to appoint the remaining members. Chile indicated that it should not only 
be the five Great Powers who chose which four would represent the smaller 
states.55 England, however, responded that the original proposal did not pro-
vide for representation on the Executive Council of the smaller powers.56  
Another important aim of the Great Powers was securing the status 
quo on controlling the sources of international law through jurisprudence. 
Thus, the reasons given for creating a permanent international court were 
that judges would not only develop but, in the course of time, create a sys-
tem of international jurisprudence. The new arbitral court would not likely 
stray from previous decisions, unless there was a very strong reason to do 
so. Moreover, because their decisions would be precedent for future deci-
sions, the arbiters would take time and effort in the opinions they crafted.57 
As for the neutrality of the court, some countries doubted its impartial-
ity, such as Japan after PCAJ decided a case against it in 1903. This experi-
ence taught Japan that international law as it was, dominated by European 
Powers, worked against their interest, and that there was an inherent preju-
dice against them, so they saw international law as a set of technical tools to 
be manipulated by the Great Powers.58  
Non-western states’ proposals were rejected. The demand for legal 
equality by non-European countries was opposed, because in the opinions 
of the Europe and the United States, these states did not pass the test of civi-
lization to enjoy legal equality. The test of civilization refers to the alleged 
                                                                                                                           
 54 MILLER, supra note 43, at 621–22. Lord Cecil, the English delegate, said the other states 
were there “not to discuss at that meeting the general principles which should underlie the League, 
but to hear what particular alterations or amendments the neutral States desired to see in the Cove-
nant.” Id. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela were the neutral states. Id. 
 55 Id. at 624, 634. Denmark proposed that the Executive Council be composed of two repre-
sentatives from each of the Great Powers, the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and 
eight from the other members of the League, “at the meeting of the Body of Delegates in accord-
ance with such principles and conditions as it shall deem fit.” Id. at 634. 
 56 See id. at 624. 
 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 351. 
 58 See Hisashi Owanda, Japan, International Law, and the International Community, in JA-
PAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 347, 355–56 (Nisuke Ando ed., 
1999) (describing Japan’s discontent after the Yokohama House Tax Case); see also Becker Lor-
ca, supra note 40, at 40 (describing how Owanda believes Japan was disillusioned with the inter-
national court after this decision). 
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superiority of Europe by scholars such as T.J. Lawrence who argued that 
international law was not limited to Christian states, but also applied to non-
Christian states that are civilized and have adopted the “European interna-
tional code.”59 For Lawrence, recognizing a greater number of sovereign 
states did not mean that all of them would necessarily be considered equal. 
This is because westerners were thought to be able to speak for everyone, as 
opposed to the claim of non-westerners that deducted from sovereignty the 
principle of absolute equality in the configuration of the new court and in 
the treatment and application of the law.60 
Some western European delegates showed their power when they af-
firmed they would not need non-western states’ consent to approve a con-
vention. Should strict equality be recognized in international agreements, 
too much power would be given to weak states,61 which would threaten the 
privileges of western countries, and could pose future problems.62 Western 
jurists used the doctrine of the “standard of civilization” to justify the exclu-
sion of non-western claims for equal sovereignty.63 As Becker Lorca de-
scribed, “ideas supported by semi-peripheral authors are ‘old,’ too formalis-
tic in their attachment to the principle of sovereignty, whereas ideas ad-
vanced by Western authors at the center are ‘modern,’ attuned with the im-
peratives of time and closer to the real nature (anarchic) and needs (interde-
pendence) of the international community.”64  
 When core states were confronted with well-reasoned arguments re-
garding the right to equality, however, they moved forward to create theo-
ries and justifications to impede absolute equality for semi-peripheral states 
from Latin America, Asia, and the Middle-East, coming from general rules 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 51–52. 
 60 T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–5, 65–67 (1895); Becker 
Lorca, supra note 40, at 51–52; see JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: 
A TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 170–72 (1883) 
(describing how equality among states was a fiction). 
 61 See Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 56 (noting concerns of western countries regarding the 
policy of equality among all nations). Frederick Charles Hicks noted that “the doctrine of equality 
was untrue in its origin, was preserved in international law by a verbal consent which is not fol-
lowed by performance.” Frederick Charles Hicks, The Equality of States and the Hague Confer-
ences, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 530, 535 (1908). And that “in the absence of international organizations, 
states have no rights but powers. Thus there no need to premise rights of states to be equal.” Id. at 
534. 
 62 See Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 56 n.137 (noting that “[t]he British Bluebook” on the 
Hague Conference stated that “[t]he claim of many smaller states to equality as regards not only 
their independence, but their share in all international institutions . . . is one which may produce 
great difficulties, and may perhaps drive the greater Powers to act in many cases by themselves”). 
 63 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 57. 
 64 Id. at 51. 
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of nature as the Swiss delegate, Max Huber, noted at the 1907 Hague Con-
ference.65 
The controversy that emerged between powerful and less powerful 
states regarded the scope of intervention by Great Powers in small nations’ 
internal policies and world affairs. Powerful states advocated to maintain 
their power to decide on the substance of the law, on its scope, on the cate-
gory of rights that can be given to less powerful countries, and on the judg-
es that can resolve the differences between the states. Less powerful states 
struggled to be taken into account on the construction of the international 
rule of law, and to be judged on the same grounds as powerful states. 
At the Second Hague Conference, Latin American states affirmed their 
membership in the world of civilized nations to claim their sovereign status, 
although some powerful countries tried to deny this status. On equal sover-
eignty, Brazil opined that everyone’s sovereignty should be respected by vir-
tue of having been invited.66 Some countries justified a court based on une-
qual power over the conformation of the court by claiming that the Great 
Powers were not willing to subject their claims to judges from other nations.67 
Smaller states, however, resisted this claim. 
The proposal of appointing rotating judges, giving preference to those 
from Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, gener-
ated great disagreement among Western powers and Latin American states. 
James Brown Scott, as Reporter of the Commission on the Court of Arbitral 
Justice, recognized the equality of every state, and that any distinction be-
tween large and small states was not proper to international law. He also 
said, however, that an “abstract right to equality” would not allow the court 
to have a representative from all nations sitting on it.68  
Scott tried to convince smaller nations that there was a method inde-
pendent of the question of power, which did not give priority to the relative 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. at 62–63. Huber noted “States other than great powers, which invoked state equality, 
have neither given reasons for the necessity of legal equality nor distinguished the meaning. They 
started out assuming this proposition to be at the basis of international law and to stand as a matter 
of principle beyond discussion.” See id. 
 66 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: 
THE HAGUE, JUNE 15–OCTOBER 18, 1907, translated in 2 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES 620 (1921) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE 
VOL. II] (arguing “if States excluded from the First Peace Conference have been invited to the 
Second, it is not with a view to having them solemnly sign an act derogatory of their sovereignty 
by reducing them to a scale of classification which the more powerful nations would like to have 
recognized”); Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 32 n.66. 
 67 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 33 n.67; see PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFER-
ENCE VOL. II, supra note 66, at 150 (referring to such judges from these countries as “the most 
corrupt and most backward States of Asia and of South America”). 
 68 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 28. 
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strength and weakness of nations, to appoint a smaller number of judges 
without violating the sovereign equality of states. He referred to this as the 
“material interests” of the state.69 A state’s material interest would depend 
on the frequency of its interactions with other states. This implied that an 
analysis of a state’s population, commerce, and industry would become a 
way to determine the composition of the court. Therefore, a nation with a 
large population, along with commercial and industrial interests, would 
need “to have a constant representation in the court, in order that its inter-
ests may be protected and safeguarded by a judge of its own choice.”70 
Scott also argued to less powerful countries that the joint proposal pre-
sented by the United States, Germany, and Great Britain did not violate the 
principle of sovereign equality. Under this proposal, every state would ap-
point a judge, thus permitting equality of representation, but judges would 
rotate, serving for lengths of time that would depend on a state’s ranking.71 
The countries’ classification based upon population, commerce, and industry 
always placed Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great 
Britain, Japan, and Russia on the top of the list, who would serve for the full 
period of twelve years; Spain, the Netherlands, and Turkey would serve for 
ten years; China, four Latin American States, and other small European 
countries for four years; Persia, and the other sixteen Latin American states 
for one year.72 Scott went on to suggest to peripheral states to move beyond 
formalisms because international law had moved in a new direction based 
on the solidarity of interests and the needs of the people.73 Brazil opposed 
the proposal and proposed a new project, which was not discussed at all 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. 
 70 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. II, supra note 66, at 610 (noting 
that “industry and commerce give rise to conflicts, and that it may well be that a nation with a very 
numerous population, and with large commercial and industrial interest, feels it necessary to have 
a constant representation in the court, in order that its interests may be protected and safeguarded 
by a judge of its own choice”). Scott also recognized that the “systems of law. . . existing in the 
civilized world should be considered . . . .” Id. 
 71 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 29. 
 72 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. II, supra note 66, at 612–13 (show-
ing the entire chart). 
 73 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 59. Becker Lorca summarizes Scott’s view:  
[T]he system of rotating judges . . . limits a small state’s exercise of the right to 
equality, but it does so based on the needs and the nature of the international com-
munity. If the international community is not perfectly homogeneous, its institutions 
cannot mirror absolute equality . . . . [i]n Scott’s view, the method he proposed to se-
lect judges did not reflect power equations, but a state’s different levels of interna-
tional interaction and commerce, its experience and legal traditions. 
Id. at 60. 
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because the committee was not competent to examine an entirely new pro-
ject.74 
The proposal of appointing the judges by rotation, giving preference to 
Great Powers, was ultimately defeated. To avoid a failure of the Second 
Hague Conference, Great Britain “proposed a diluted voeu, a recommenda-
tion for signatory states to adopt the project, and a recommendation to put 
the convention into force as soon as agreement had been reached in relation 
to the selection of judges.”75 Most of the committee that examined the pro-
posals for the pacific settlement of international disputes approved the pro-
ject and the voeu with declarations and reservations. The project then went 
to the First Commission of the Hague’s Peace Conference of 1907, where 
other semi-peripheral states voiced their views opposing to the principle of 
inequality. For example, Mexico declared that its vote was conditioned on 
the equality of states being recognized in future negotiations, the principle 
of equality of states not being violated, and that it had to be “respected and 
maintained as the basis of the election of the judges and the organization of 
the Court.”76 Other Latin American countries, such as Colombia, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, adhered to the reservations and declarations made by 
Brazil, which similarly recommended the new court of arbitration respect 
equal sovereignty.77 Haiti declared it would accept the principle of estab-
lishing a court under similar conditions,78 as did Venezuela.79 
In 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, the discussion about the prin-
ciple of equality of all states arose again. Japan proposed to include in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations a clause recognizing the principle of 
racial equality to reassure equal treatment by western powers. This clause 
declared equality between races, and entitled participation in the regime of 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. II, supra note 66, at 624; Beck-
er Lorca, supra note 40, at 31. 
 75 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 33. 
 76 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE VOL. I, supra note 40, at 327 (stating 
their vote “is cast under condition that, in future negotiations between Governments, the principle 
of equality of states shall not be violated and that, on the contrary, it shall be respected and main-
tained as the basis of the election of the judges and the organization of the Court”). 
 77 Id. at 327–28 (noting “under the absolute condition that the actual observation of the prin-
ciple of the equality of sovereign States be understood, as it was defined by . . . the subcommittee, 
which rejected the system of rotation and that of the choice of judges by foreign electors”). 
 78 Id. at 328 (saying they supported it “under the formal condition that the constitution thereof 
be based upon the legal equality of States”). 
 79 Id. (voting “in favor of the British voeu provided it be understood that the principle of legal 
equality of States is to be recognized in all cases in the constitution of the court and in the choice 
of judges”). Uruguay abstained from voting, but declared that “international justice may not be 
established except upon the basis of the legal equality of States.” Id. 
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equality reserved to civilized nations. This proposal was ultimately defeat-
ed, despite the support of Brazil, China, and Romania.80 
At the final meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations, Japan 
presented a second proposal to include in the Covenant’s Preamble of the 
League of Nations, endorsing the principle of equality of nations and the just 
treatment of their nationals. Britain opposed the proposal, however, arguing 
that the racial question encroached on the sovereignty of League members. 
Japan then asked the Commission to put the amendment to a vote, and it ob-
tained a majority of votes, but the United States rejected the amendment be-
cause it had not received unanimous approval.81 
Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden proposed amendments 
objecting to compulsory arbitration but not to the creation of a judicial 
court. On the composition of the court, Denmark declared that the equality 
of states was crucial.82 
To conclude, between 1907 and 1919, international courts’ composi-
tion by western judges was secured through power in the treaties that creat-
ed them. Internationalists in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century interpreted international law on the basis of assumptions that larger, 
more economically powerful countries knew best, giving different applica-
tions to the state’s sovereign equality, depending on whether a country was 
sufficiently economically robust. This shifted the influence from a truly fair 
and unbiased court to one that entrenched large countries’ power. This could 
be perpetuated today with biased investment judges deciding according to 
similar political considerations on the state’s sovereign space of developed 
and developing states, hence breaking sovereign regulatory equality once 
again. Furthermore, this is a concern that has not been even arisen in the 
ICS, which if not addressed properly, could arise in the proposed MIC, 
where the appointment of judges could be highly politicized. 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 42–43. Japan’s proposal stated:  
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High 
Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of 
States members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no 
distinction, either in law or fact, on account of their race or nationality. 
Id. at 43. 
 81 MILLER, supra note 43, at 389–92; Becker Lorca, supra note 40, at 44–45.  
 82 MILLER, supra note 43, at 628. Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden were also concerned about 
the “juridical equality of States,” and commented that this principle should be taken into account. 
Id. at 629. Moreover, “the representative of Colombia said that his government assented in princi-
ple to the Covenant, which ought to be based on the juridical equality of States.” Id. at 632. 
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III. THE CASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION APPELLATE BODY 
The EU has shown that it has the power to lead the ISDS reform. It has 
legitimized itself, stating that the need for reform has been recognized glob-
ally and that no country is satisfied with how it is working.83 As support for 
this statement, the EU references UNCTAD’s works, the internal EU con-
sultation, and some consultations with other unknown countries as a refer-
ence of the world’s discontent. The EU believes that it is in the best position 
to foster reform and has the responsibility to lead the reform as the founder 
and the main actor.84 The EU’s concerns over the legitimacy of the ISDS due 
to the lack of arbitrators’ accountability, however, will not likely be solved by 
having permanent judges or by a formal public character of the MIC. This is 
because, should those judges be appointed in the same manner as the WTO 
appellate body or ICJ judges, they will not likely be independent because 
their appointment and performance may be subject to political pressures 
from some states that have more capacity to influence in the construction 
and control of the international institution.85 
Judicial independence is an important prerequisite for the credibility 
and legitimacy of international courts and tribunals. This merits a close re-
view of standards of judicial independence and impartiality, to avoid any 
kind of bias by possible MIC judges and to ensure their independence from 
political organs,86 states, or investors. 
The EU posits that judges that are appointed in advance of any particu-
lar dispute and serve fixed terms would be independent, and thus more ef-
fective at resolving disputes than ad hoc arbitrators. But independent tribu-
nals may pose a danger because they can render decisions that conflict with 
the interests of state parties, so states will be reluctant to use international 
tribunals unless they have degree of control over the outcome.87 Commenta-
tors have noted, however, that ad hoc arbitrators would be more successful, 
                                                                                                                           
 83 EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 15, at 21 
 84 Id.; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT GOVERNANCE (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_overview_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/T4DA-2PBQ]. 
 85 In the case of Chile and Mexico, the EU has announced these countries will take a second 
step in the near future to “modernise” and make compatible their FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) 
with the “FTA with Canada and the future agreement with the United States.” EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 15, at 33. 
 86 Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independ-
ence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 283–84 (2003). 
 87 Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). 
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in terms of independence, because they do not bend to the interests of 
states.88 Nevertheless, experience has shown differently. 
Investment arbitrators are currently chosen by the parties to a dispute. 
The reasons to appoint an individual may vary, yet each party expects that 
its nominee shares the same or similar values, or is at least closer to its in-
terests.89 Similarly, it would be expected that when states nominate or ap-
point a judge for the ICS or MIC, they will know that the judge may be in-
volved in deciding a case that has an impact on its budget and public poli-
cies, or even having sovereignty costs by the judicial decisions which states 
seek to diminish.90 Thus, States most likely want to ensure the nomination 
of someone who they can trust.91 
Judicial nominations are formal acts by a state, typically made by pro-
posing to an international body the name of its candidate, followed by the 
appointment of the individual at the plenary power of the institution. On the 
other hand, the process of selecting national nominees is an informal one, 
not requiring any sort of formal announcement, and is sometimes driven by 
political decisions or a local lobby. Thus, for the international court, states 
will further attempt to appoint judges whose preferences are relatively simi-
lar to their own.92 
In the case of a MIC, it is foreseeable that there will only be a few 
seats for judges. This will result in a competition among the different inter-
ests from the states, in which political power will play an important role to 
control the court. That power would need to be shaped by clear and trans-
parent rules to avoid inequality and biased judges. 
In selective representation courts, for example, the nomination of can-
didates is the first stage at which nominees are weighed.93 A selection is 
made from a number of candidates by either a voting rule of majorities, or 
consensus among the states-parties, the former which requires a significant-
ly higher threshold and provides member states a de facto veto over other 
states’ candidates.94 Such veto power is now being used by larger, more 
powerful states. It is also clear that not all states enjoy equal influence to 
negotiate the seats, so they are constrained to accept formal or informal 
rules of geographic distribution of seats. This means guaranteed or perma-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 6–7. 
 89 Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 86, at 278.  
 90 Elsig & Pollak, supra note 30, at 397. 
 91 See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 86, at 278 (describing how states likely only put for-
ward candidates who share similar sentiments on issues as the state itself). 
 92 Elsig & Pollak, supra note 30, at 398. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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nent seats for certain countries or regions, and a significant amount of polit-
ical jockeying for smaller states to get their candidates nominated. Conse-
quently, although countries with guaranteed seats are in a strong agenda-
setting position, other members are subject to the reception of their nomina-
tion among the electorate. “In the ensuing elections, member states typically 
engage in extensive lobbying, bargaining, and ‘horse-trading’ on behalf of 
their national candidates, and final appointments are often the result of 
messy compromises among the members.”95 
The EU proposed that the ICJ and WTO would be the models to mold 
the MIC, even though their appointment procedures are highly politicized 
and unbalanced against SMEs. 
IV. THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES IN THE ICJ 
The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly and Security Council 
elects fifteen judges to the ICJ for renewable nine-year terms. No two judg-
es may have the same nationality, and the entire bench must represent the 
“main forms of civilization” and “principal legal systems of the world.”96 
The five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Rus-
sia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) always have a judge from 
their own state —a practice that may raise issues about judicial independ-
ence. The other ten judges are allocated amongst the five regional groupings 
in the U.N. system, with each grouping receiving two judges. Elections for 
the remaining ten judges to the ICJ are subject to political competition among 
smaller states to obtain the support of powerful countries. Without the support 
of any powerful states, to avoid their vetoing, the electoral prospects for any 
candidate would be minimal. Also, this process involves both formal and in-
formal meetings between the candidates and diplomatic representatives of 
U.N. members, which may compromise candidate’s independence.97  
If the appointment of judges in the MIC is similar to that of the ICJ, then 
unequal treatment will most likely prevail. The appointment process for the 
ICJ has long been criticized as obscure, open to political interference, and 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. As Elsig and Pollak note, “[i]n such cases, countries with guaranteed seats are in a par-
ticularly strong agenda-setting position, with their candidates virtually guaranteed acceptance, 
while other members must consider the likely reception of their nomination among the electorate.” 
Id. 
 96 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 9, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
 97 Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 86, at 278 (describing how powerful nations can influence 
the election of judges from other countries). 
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lacking transparency.98 There is a risk of “vote trading,” where states lend 
their support to nominees from other countries based on political considera-
tions, and veto by powerful countries that do not like certain appointments.99  
V. APPOINTMENTS IN THE WTO 
The WTO Appellate Body (AB)100 nomination process has become 
more and more politicized over time. Some states are now seeking to influ-
ence WTO rulings to protect their own interests by nominating and appoint-
ing AB members whose nationality, judicial philosophy, and views on spe-
cific issues are close to their own interests. States are also using their pow-
ers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the preferences of 
AB members, which could potentially affect their independence and impar-
tiality.101 
As in CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA, the WTO did not clearly pro-
vide a procedure to appoint its judges beyond that the AB “shall be broadly 
representative of membership.”102 In 1994, for the first appointment, a 
committee appointed to provide guidance for the notion of what was meant 
by “broadly representative,” interpreted that “factors such as different geo-
graphical areas, levels of development, and legal systems shall be duly tak-
en into account.”103 The EU demanded that two seats should go to citizens 
from its countries to “reflect its economic importance” and, the United 
States also wanted two seats, given its importance in world trade.104 Most 
states opposed, and the United States and EU eventually accepted one seat 
each. Many delegations expressed frustration because their candidates were 
not appointed.105 Without a rule of law, it was accepted that the EU, the 
United States, and Japan each would get a seat, so for the remaining ones, 
the WTO turned to regional representation, from countries in Asia, Africa, 
and South America. 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, 
AND POLITICS 173 (2010) (summarizing the results of a study on the ICJ appointment process). 
 99 Id. at 122. 
 100 The Appellate Body hears the appeals from reports issued by panels in trade disputes 
brought by WTO Members. The AB is appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body to serve four-
year terms. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes: 
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In initial appointments of AB members, the Great Powers wanted to 
appoint judges from their own states without considering that the appointed 
judges could adopt controversial decisions with implications for states’ sov-
ereignty and economic interests. Now, WTO members are examining the 
substantive opinions of AB candidates and systematically supporting the 
ones whose views conformed with their own, while simultaneously oppos-
ing those whose views conflicted.106 
At the second appointments, some candidates faced a veto from the 
United States for their prior decisions that went against U. S. interests. This 
is presumably what happened with Merit Janow, who did not seek reap-
pointment, because the United States Trade Representative (USTR) ex-
pressed concerns with his past decisions.107 As a former USTR official 
mentioned, they were not fond that judges from their own country were rul-
ing against their interests.108 
The politicization of the process has gone even further because candi-
dates are pushed to meet as many WTO members as possible and to plan 
visits to Washington and Brussels. Some of the concerns expressed by some 
WTO members to the nominees are “about filling gaps and the AB making 
law.”109 
WTO’s short history on appointing AB members shows that the same 
political considerations from 1899-1919 have not changed, and that power 
is still being deployed to safeguard exporting capital countries interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussions in 1899-1919 were in essence similar to those of to-
day. Europe presented a project for the establishment of a court of law, and 
the rest had to follow. Back then, the proposed court aimed to solve the Eu-
ropean recurring problem of war; today, it is the risk of losing claims and 
regulatory power. What is interesting is that sovereignty and equality were, 
and still are, underlying the debate. Semi-peripheral states are invited to 
negotiate, but with little chance to discuss nor change what previously was 
agreed among European States from the EU. 
Past behavior between 1907-1919 leads to the conclusion that the pro-
posed MIC will not likely be neutral and independent as is being claimed by 
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the EU. This will again raise questions about its legitimacy. As it is now, the 
EU MIC proposal based on the CETA blueprint does not seem to be an im-
partial dispenser of justice which could provide democratic rule-based deci-
sions. On the contrary, because the proposal was launched with state ap-
pointed judges to replace ad hoc arbitrators and no written rules on how 
MIC judges would be appointed, it looks to be merely another manifestation 
of state power and influence in international relations that seeks to promote 
the EU’s own interests. Should rules governing the nomination and election 
of MIC judges that guarantee independence, impartiality, and equality not 
be implemented, such process will still be politicized and opaque, as the ICJ 
and WTO’s appointment processes already are. It is questionable to keep 
ICJ’s and WTO’s practice to give geographic distribution of members and de 
facto permanent seats for the EU and the United States because this is far 
equality. Conversely, keeping the current practice of appointment for the MIC 
will provide these countries with greater agenda-setting power to influence on 
the election of all the judges and to control over the proposed court judges 
compared to SMEs lack of decision and control on who will decide their cas-
es. 
Permanent investment judges will make decisions that will affect the 
lives of people. Any jurisprudence that considers differences between SMEs 
and developed ones, or that is biased on the assumption that the rule of law 
does not operate on such states, could create serious problems for the for-
mer. The legitimacy problems of the arbitrators’ work that are being ques-
tioned today will not be able to be solved by the new ICS, because the judg-
es appointed might be biased in favor of the states that have the power to 
appoint or to veto them in the future. Thus, the proposed reform does not 
seem good for SMEs. 
Although a MIC might be desirable, the current political and interna-
tional conditions are not appropriate to trust the state policy space and to 
protect legitimate public interest concerns of every country to a few judges. 
The former could be politically influenced by the powerful states, or may 
have negative incentives that prevent them from having the required neu-
trality and independence to impartially solve the cases presented before 
them. 
The ISDS framework as it is today—with many of its own problems 
and criticisms that are widely agreed upon—still might be better for SMEs 
and investors than a multilateral system. This is because a bad precedent in 
the interpretation of a case can profoundly affect policy space or investor 
rights in some jurisdictions forever. As it is, the current system at least al-
lows the parties to continue to have the chance to intervene in the appoint-
ment of arbitrators in every case, without the burden of blockings and/or 
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vetoes to a judge by powerful countries, as could be the case in the pro-
posed court system. 
The establishment of a MIC may be a good solution to increase the 
predictability, transparency, coherence, and independence of arbitrators, but 
would depend heavily on whether there is a multilateral substantive invest-
ment tool in place, and if the selection process to appoint the judges is 
transparent, detached from political motivations, and substantially considers 
the interests of SMEs. 
Similarly, as the United States suggested in the WTO for the reform of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the ISDS needs more guid-
ance as to the rules of interpretation, the prevention of gap filling, fragmen-
tation, and “restrictions on addressing constructive ambiguity,” so the MIC 
should not engage in making law.110 
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